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Abstract

DISPOSITIONAL MINDFULNESS AS A MODERATOR OF ELECTROCORTICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO AFFECTIVE SOCIAL STIMULI
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science
at Virginia Commonwealth University.
by
Jordan T. Quaglia, B.A, M.A.

Major Director: Kirk Warren Brown, PhD,
Associate Professor of Social and Health Psychology,
Department of Psychology

Numerous studies have linked dispositional mindfulness to enhanced emotion regulation.
The present research examined dispositional mindfulness as a predictor of emotion regulation in
social affective contexts. Participants completed passive viewing and Emotional Go/No-Go tasks
involving social affective stimuli (happy, neutral, and fearful facial expressions). Event-related
potentials (ERPs) and behavioral responses were examined to discern whether dispositional
mindfulness predicted differential neural and behavioral responses indexing attention to,
awareness of, and inhibitory control over automatic responses to affective social stimuli.
Dispositional mindfulness predicted larger (more negative) N100, N200 and No-Go N200
amplitudes during the Emotional Go/No-Go task, but was not associated with amplitude of the
Late Positive Potential during the passive viewing task. Dispositional mindfulness also predicted
faster response times (RT) to target stimuli that were not attributable to a speed-accuracy
tradeoff. No relations were found between mindfulness and RT variability nor accuracy.

Implications for understanding mindfulness and early processes of social emotion regulation are
discussed.

Dispositional Mindfulness as a Moderator
of Electrocortical and Behavioral Responses to Affective Social Stimuli
Background and Motivation
Nearly every day we come face-to-face with others’ emotions. This may be truer for
individuals in particular environments and professions (e.g., helping professionals), but exposure
to others’ emotions, including their distress, commonly occurs in everyday interactions and
through various media (Olsson, Nearing, & Phelps, 2007). Because the emotions of others are
such a ubiquitous part of our social lives, how we process and respond to them may have farreaching intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences. A primary way we are exposed to others’
emotions is through their facial expressions. Faces are social stimuli that serve to communicate
motivationally salient information, and in a manner similar to unpleasant and pleasant nonsocial
stimuli, unpleasant social stimuli have been shown to result in withdraw-oriented processing,
whereas pleasant social stimuli result in approach-oriented processing (Hare, Tottenham,
Davidson, Glover, & Casey, 2005). Evaluation of both social and nonsocial stimuli as, most
basically, “good” or “bad” appears to occur automatically (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000), and this
evaluation prepares the organism immediately to approach or avoid (Chen & Bargh, 1999).
Even in the context of such motivationally salient stimuli, facial expressions can be
considered a unique kind of stimuli because of perceivers’ tendency for automatic, subconscious
mimicry of facial expression, a key mechanism underlying emotional contagion (Cacioppo &
Hatfield, 1993). Through both automatic evaluation and mimicry, one function of facial
expressions may be to orient others’ behavioral systems to danger or safety (Darwin, 1878;
Mineka & Cook, 1993; Sorce & Emde, 1981; Fox, 2002). Yet automatic responses to, and
mimicry of, others’ emotions may not always function as adaptive drivers of behavior in
contemporary cultures.
1

There are likely many adaptive benefits, both personal and social, to greater emotion
regulation and emotion-related behavior regulation (hereafter, behavior regulation) during
exposure to affective social stimuli. Perhaps most relevant to the present study is that goal
pursuit often necessitates behavior in opposition to our automatic approach/withdraw responses
(Berkman & Lieberman, 2010), such as when a dieter passes up sweets (avoiding appetitive
stimuli) or when a tired athlete runs one more lap (approaching aversive stimuli). The
achievement of many goals is thus dependent on emotion and behavior regulation comprised of
goal-directed monitoring and governance of automatic approach/withdraw responses (Berkman
& Lieberman, 2010). In social contexts, this type of goal-directed regulation may be necessary to
appropriately respond to others’ emotions (Hare et al., 2005). For example, maintaining good
relationships at work may require overriding innate tendencies to avoid an aversive encounter
with an angry colleague. Indeed, decrements in self-regulation have been associated with
reductions in the quality of social behavior (Kanske, Heissler, Schonfelder, Bongers, Wessa,
2011; Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Morris, 2002; Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000). For
example, participants high in emotion regulation were rated higher in interpersonal sensitivity
and prosocial tendencies by peers (Lopes, Salovey, Coté, & Beers, 2005). Successful social
behavior and social goal achievement may thus depend on goal-relevant regulation of automatic
approach- and withdraw-oriented responses to others’ emotions, in a manner similar to
regulating these responses in nonsocial contexts (Cacioppo, 2002).
Automatic mimicry of others’ facial expressions is another process generally considered
to have great adaptive value, helping one to establish social connections and understand others’
perspectives (McIntosh, Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman, & Wilbarger, 2006). However, such
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automatic mimicry may have maladaptive consequences if one is constantly “catching” others’
distress. Distress contagion, whereby the distress of others induces personal distress (Eisenberg
& Eggum, 2009), is another compelling example of when automatic responses to others’
emotions may inhibit emotion regulation and compromise autonomy. Evidence suggests that
socially transmitted fear may influence behavior as strongly as direct personal experience, even
once the fear has already been transmitted (Olsson et al., 2007). Catching others’ distress could
thus be detrimental when others’ distress is not the most appropriate response to the
environment. For example, emotion regulation has been identified as critical to empathic
responding - that is, through helping one govern and manage intrapersonal emotions activated by
perceiving others’ distress (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009). The capacity to regulate one’s own
emotions in the face of others’ distress can be considered a key boundary separating empathy
from simple distress contagion, the latter of which may lead to overarousal (Eisenberg & Eggum,
2009). As an illustration, imagine how a clinician’s automatic (withdraw-oriented) response to
and mimicry of his patient’s fearful facial expression may interfere with his capacity to skillfully
identify and treat his patient’s anxiety.
Accurate discrimination of others’ emotional expressions is a key component of
successful social emotion regulation (Tottenham, Hare, & Casey, 2011), including control over
automatic mimicry and behavioral response to others’ emotions. In order to override one’s
impulse to approach a smiling petitioner vying for attention on one’s walk to work, for example,
explicit recognition of the happy expression affords greater conscious control over one’s
automatic response. Because basic discrimination processes depend on early deployment of
attention (Vogel & Luck, 2000), social emotion regulation involves efficient attention to others’
emotions in addition to cognitive control of emotional processing. Indeed, early attentional
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processing to emotional information is considered a critical component of emotion regulation
(Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & Thompson, 2012). From this perspective, initial attention to
emotional stimuli influences “downstream” processing for better or worse. Over time, experience
and goal-driven deployment of attention shapes habits of initial attention that inform subsequent
emotional processing (Todd et al., 2012). Regular top-down deployment of attention to others’
emotions may therefore “tune” more bottom-up attention such that it becomes reflexively
applied. For example, both normative and clinical anxiety are associated with heightened early
attention to threat-relevant versus neutral or happy stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin,
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van IJzendoorn, 2007). On the other hand, such affect-biased
attention to one category of stimuli over another is malleable, and can be attenuated through
systematic cognitive training (Hakamata et al., 2010). This perspective suggests a complex
interplay between voluntary and stimulus-driven attention to emotional information that
highlights the importance of investigating factors that may influence early attention and emotion
regulation in the presence of others’ emotions.
In summary, social situations provide unique challenges for emotion regulation, including
noticing, discriminating between, and appropriately responding to others’ emotions and one’s
automatic responses to them. Therefore, exploring factors which promote ongoing sensitivity to
both intra- and inter-personal influences on emotional processing is important for understanding
adaptive social emotion regulation. One such factor is dispositional mindfulness, defined as “an
enhanced attention to and awareness of current experience or present reality” (Brown & Ryan,
2003, p. 822), and previously linked with enhanced intrapersonal emotional sensitivity (Hill &
Updegraff, 2012) and emotion regulation (e.g., Way, Creswell, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2010;
Brown, Weinstein, & Creswell, 2012). The present study examined whether mindfulness predicts
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improved emotion regulation in social emotional situations through investigating relations
between self-reported mindfulness and neural/behavioral responses to affective facial
expressions.
Relevance of Mindfulness to Social Emotion Regulation
Automatic approach/withdraw responses to emotional facial expressions have been
shown to influence behavior regulation in normal populations (Hare et al., 2005). But studying
how mindfulness influences emotional processing of affective social stimuli may not only inform
our understanding of normative processes, it could also have clinical relevance. Cognitiveaffective interactions may be critical for understanding disruptions in behavior regulation
common to a variety of affective disorders (Schulz, Fan, Magidina, Marks, Hahn, & Halperin,
2007) as well as behavior problems more generally (Eisenberg et al., 2000). For example, both
clinical and subclinical levels of anxiety have been associated with attention bias toward threatrelated stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Eldar, Yankelevitch, Lamy, & Bar-Haim, 2010). These
differences reflect heightened sensitivity to both social and nonsocial threat-relevant affective
stimuli, and are hypothesized to contribute to the etiology and preservation of anxiety (Beck,
1967; Vasey & MacLeod, 2001).
Indeed, it has been theorized that disruptions in emotion regulation may be a central
mechanism underlying mood and anxiety disorders (Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007). Because
mindfulness appears to promote adaptive emotion regulation (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2007;
Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2011), the study of neural responses to affective social stimuli could
contribute to an understanding of multiple mechanisms underlying more adaptive sensitivity to
one’s own and others’ emotions. Moreover, because there is evidence that one’s level of
dispositional mindfulness may increase with training (Shapiro, Brown, Thoresen, & Plante,
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2011; Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch, 2011), understanding mechanisms of emotion
regulation associated with mindfulness may inform clinical interventions targeting mood and
anxiety disorders. For example, in patients with Social Anxiety Disorder, Goldin & Gross (2010)
demonstrated that training mindfulness through an 8-week, Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction
program (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) decreased symptoms of depression and anxiety, as well as enhanced
the efficacy of an adaptive emotion regulation strategy during the processing of negative selfbeliefs.
Research on individual differences in mindfulness has also provided neuroscientific and
behavioral evidence suggestive of adaptive emotion and behavior regulation. By definition,
mindfulness involves less automatic emotional evaluation of stimuli through simple, nonevaluative observation of stimuli (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). A number of studies have
confirmed this at the level of neurophysiology, linking dispositional mindfulness to differential
neural responses to unpleasant stimuli. Two studies have found that higher dispositional
mindfulness is associated with less amygdala reactivity to negative emotional faces (fear and
anger; Way et al., 2010; Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007). Furthermore,
Creswell et al. (2007) found stronger negative associations between a number of regions of the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) and amygdala activation among those scoring higher in trait mindfulness
(using the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale [MAAS]; Brown & Ryan, 2003). This suggests
that mindfulness promotes more efficient PFC down-regulation of amygdala responses to
emotional information (Creswell et al., 2007). Conversely, greater amygdala reactivity to
negative faces has been associated with depressive symptomalogy (Way et al., 2010) and both
subclinical (Stein, Simmons, Feinstein, & Paulus, 2007) and clinical anxiety (Rauch, Shin, &
Wright, 2003). Most recently, mindfulness was associated with attenuated neural reactivity
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between 500 and 900 ms after stimulus onset (the Late Positive Potential; LPP) to a mix of social
and nonsocial, high arousal pleasant and unpleasant, motivationally salient stimuli (Brown et al.,
2012). This indicates that dispositional mindfulness is associated with less “upstream” evaluative
processing of high arousal emotional stimuli.
While a large number of studies have corroborated an association between mindfulness
training and improvements in task performance across a wide variety of cognitive domains and
functions (Grossenbacher & Quaglia, in preparation), there has been considerably less research
linking dispositional mindfulness to differential task-based behavioral performance. However,
task performance studies on this topic thus far show some support for a relation between
dispositional mindfulness and factors that may promote greater emotion and behavior regulation.
For example, studies have also associated dispositional mindfulness with greater capacity for
sustained attention (Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Schmertz, Anderson, & Robins, 2009). Perhaps
most relevant to the present study, studies have linked mindfulness to greater inhibitory control
for both emotional and affect-neutral stimuli. In a sample of formerly depressed adults, higher
trait mindfulness (MAAS) predicted greater inhibition of negative facial expressions when
inhibition was counter to task goals (De Raedt, Baert, Demeyer, & Goeleven, 2012). In that
study, MAAS scores also predicted less inhibition of positive facial expressions, suggesting an
emotional sensitivity to which affective information necessitates inhibition, and overall less
biases of attention (De Raedt et al., 2012). Regarding inhibitory control for affect-neutral stimuli,
Josefsson & Broberg (2010) found that dispositional mindfulness was related to less behavioral
response interference on a computerized Stroop task (Josefsson & Broberg, 2010). Similarly
scores on the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) Act with
Awareness subscale have been related to less interference on a measure of active inhibitory
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control, requiring intentional inhibition of distractors (Lee & Chao, 2012). Because inhibition of
prepotent responses is an executive function central to self-regulatory processing generally
(Hofman, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012), dispositional mindfulness, as an attention-based
marker of executive function, may also be related to greater emotion and behavior regulation.
However, it important to note that evidence for the relation between inhibition of prepotent
responses and dispositional mindfulness is mixed, as another study found no relation between
FFMQ scores and Stroop interference (Galla et al., 2011). Making sense of mixed findings
regarding mindfulness and inhibitory control may require an understanding of dispositional
mindfulness as a propensity towards a mindful state (Brown & Ryan, 2003), rather than an
enduring, static individual difference in attention and awareness. Indeed, it has been found that
dispositional mindfulness scores predict states of mindfulness in everyday life, as measured by
experience sampling methods (Brown & Ryan, 2003). From this view, one explanation for mixed
findings may be that task performance measures are more sensitive to these fluctuations in state
mindfulness than other kinds of dependent measures assessing chronic psychological
propensities (e.g., self-report). There may also be considerable variation in individuals with high
dispositional mindfulness regarding which contexts support versus hinder a mindful mode of
processing. Consistent with this understanding, state mindfulness, initiated by 20 minutes of
mindfulness meditation, has been linked to less Stroop interference compared to rest and learning
control conditions (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Similarly self-reported state mindfulness was
associated with less interference by unpleasant emotional information on ensuing behavior
(Ortner, Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007). Thus both theory and evidence highlight the importance of
accounting for states of mindfulness during an experimental procedure.
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Mindfulness may facilitate behavioral responding not only through less evaluation of
affective stimuli, but also through heightened open and receptive awareness of interoceptive and
exteroceptive stimuli occurring the present moment. Consistent with theory that mindfulness
promotes greater sensitivity to one’s own processing, Brown & Ryan (2003) found that higher
dispositional mindfulness positively moderated concordance between explicit and implicit state
affect, with implicit state affect measured using an IAT with “me” and “not me” crossed with
“pleasant” and “unpleasant” (Brown & Ryan, 2003). While no studies have corroborated these
associations with the temporal precision that neural markers of attention can provide, studies
have linked mindfulness to heightened attention and greater inhibitory control on measures of
task-based behavior. Regarding heightened awareness of external present-moment occurrence,
Jensen, Vangkilde, Frokjaer, & Hasselbalch (2012) found that MAAS scores predicted faster
identification of target letters (faster discrimination threshold) and that MAAS changes from preto post-mindfulness training predicted decreases in the speed of identification. Importantly,
discriminating between stimuli during a discrimination task differs from emotional evaluation (or
appraisal) of stimuli as pleasant or unpleasant. Discrimination reflects discernment between
stimuli, which can occur without an emotional response.
In short, dispositional mindfulness has been associated with less neural reactivity to
aversive stimuli, greater inhibition of prepotent responses, and greater awareness of interoceptive
and exteroceptive stimuli. It is also worth noting that two of the studies reviewed above related
dispositional mindfulness directly to reduced neural reactivity to aversive affective facial
expressions (Creswell et al., 2007; Way et al., 2010). Together these studies provide converging
evidence to support further investigation of the relation between dispositional mindfulness and
emotion and behavior regulation in the context of affective social stimuli. Specifically,
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considering the important role of early, automatic processing of others’ emotions, the study of
how individual differences influence the rapid processing of affective facial expressions may
lend insight into mechanisms that support emotion regulation in social emotional contexts.
Investigation of rapidly unfolding neural processes associated with attention, awareness, and
appraisals offers an excellent opportunity to glean such insight.
Mindfulness and “Upstream” Emotion Regulation
Stages of early emotion regulation. Understanding cognitive-affective interactions is
imperative for understanding the regulation of behavior (McClure, Botvinick, Yeung, Greene, &
Cohen, 2007; Hare et al., 2005). Investigation of cognitive-affective interaction has generally
focused on emotion regulation strategies, including cognitive reappraisal and the controlled
modulation of emotional responses (Gross, 2007). Yet these are comparatively “downstream”
responses, made after one or more appraisals or emotional responses have occurred. Recently,
research has revealed that the nature of the “upstream” or early processing of emotion-relevant
stimuli may also provide regulatory advantages (Todd et al., 2012). Regarding mindfulness,
individual differences in self-reported mindfulness were shown to modulate neural responses
associated with the early (<1 s) processing of motivationally salient, unpleasant and pleasant
stimuli (Brown et al., 2012). In other words, one way dispositional mindfulness may facilitate
emotion regulation is through modulation of the initial emotional reaction to affective stimuli.
Further research is needed to examine whether differences in early neural response to
motivationally salient stimuli, both before and during the early emotion generative process (< 1
s), are related to adaptive social emotion regulation. By examining dispositional mindfulness as a
goal-sensitive moderator of (i) initial emotional response, (ii) conflict monitoring and inhibition
of prepotent responses, and (iii) behavioral response selection, this study may facilitate
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understanding of how individual differences manifest at these three primary stages of emotion
regulation (Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994). Moreover, because a core feature of
mindfulness is heightened moment-by-moment attention (Grabovac, Lau, & Willett, 2011), it is
also important to examine whether self-reported mindfulness is associated with differential
neural response even earlier—at the level of initial attention to stimuli. Consistent with recent
conceptualizations of emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Todd et al., 2012), an early
stage of emotion regulation may occur at this level of initial attention to stimuli. According to the
process-specific timing hypothesis (Sheppes & Gross, 2011), such early attention to emotional
information may be less effortful and require fewer resources than emotion regulation occurring
further “downstream” (e.g., reappraisal, response modulation).
The purpose of the present study was to leverage the temporal precision of both
electroencephalogram (EEG)-based event-related potentials (ERPs) and task performance to
examine these stages of processing others’ emotional facial expressions. Regarding the former,
ERPs have been used extensively to study the mental chronometry associated with early
processing of both nonsocial and social stimuli. The temporal resolution of ERPs provides a
means for investigating stages of information processing that begin immediately following
stimulus exposure. Task-based behavioral measures afford a complementary window into the
information processing occurring soon after stimulus exposure, through indexes such as response
time (RT) and error rate. For the present study, distinct ERP components and behavioral
outcomes were both used to index neural and behavioral indicators of discrete stages of early
emotion regulation. Electrocortical responses were collected from participants while they
performed a passive viewing task and an Emotional Go/No-Go Task (Hare et al., 2005), in which
behavioral responses indexed speed and accuracy of discrimination of emotional facial
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expressions, as well as emotional biasing of approach and avoidance behaviors to these same
facial expressions.
N100 and early allocation of attentional resources. The visual N100 is a negativegoing waveform, occurring less than 200 ms after stimulus onset, which indexes deployment of
attentional resources to stimuli (Vogel & Luck, 2000). More specifically, the N100 is found in
tasks which require a discrimination process, including discriminating between complex stimuli
(Vogel & Luck, 2000). Moreover, the N100 has been found to be sensitive to differences in topdown attention (e.g., Ruz, Madrid, & Tudela, 2012), and at least some studies indicate it is
sensitive to valence of emotional facial expressions (Luo, Feng, He, Wang, & Luo, 2010).
Together, these findings suggest the visual N100 may be an ideal index for examining the role of
mindfulness on early allocation of attentional resources to emotional information.
No-Go N200 and conflict monitoring. Shortly following the N100, the N2 component
of the ERP waveform (approximately 200 ms after stimuli onset), is thought to reflect conflict
monitoring of the discrepancy between prepotent responses and task demands during a Go/NoGo task (Donkers & Van Boxtel, 2004). More specifically, the No-Go N2 reflects conflict
monitoring of the prepotent Go response when faced with No-Go stimuli (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung,
Van Den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003). The No-Go N2 has been related to individual
differences in political orientation (Amodio, 2007), suggesting that it may also be sensitive to
other individual differences.
Late Positive Potential and evaluative processing. While affective facial expressions
have been shown to influence many well-known components of ERP-indexed stimulus
processing (Luo et al., 2010), the late positive potential (LPP) is a component that has been
associated with differential processing of both the valence and arousal of affective stimuli
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(Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich,
2008; Weinberg & Hajcak, 2010). The LPP, a positive deflection occurring approximately 400500 ms to 900-1000 ms after stimulus onset, has been shown to be larger to pleasant and
unpleasant, compared to neutral, stimuli, and is larger for high arousal than low arousal visual
images (Schupp, Cuthbert, Bradley, Cacioppo, Ito, & Lang, 2000). Affective social stimuli have
been shown to evoke a similar neural response as to pleasant and unpleasant nonsocial stimuli
(Schupp, Junghofer, Weike, Stockburger, & Hamm, 2004), and the LPP in particular has been
shown to be sensitive to both implicit and explicit processing of facial expression valence (Van
Strien, De Sonneville, & Franken, 2010).
The LPP may reflect unique individual differences in electrocortical responses to
affective stimuli (Horan Wynn, Kring, Simons, & Green, 2010). Therefore, the study of how
dispositions moderate the LPP is important for understanding the role of the LPP in emotional
regulation more generally (Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010). Considering the evaluative
function of the LPP (Cacioppo, Crites, & Gardner, 1996) and the non-evaluative nature of
mindfulness, the LPP is one potential benchmark for understanding how mindfulness may
influence reactivity to (or appraisal of) motivationally salient stimuli. Research is needed to
examine whether dispositional mindfulness is related to an attenuation of the LPP to affective
social stimuli, in a manner similar to the mindfulness-related attenuation of mixed, social and
nonsocial stimuli (Brown et al., 2012).
Task-based behavior. In addition to ERPs, the present study examined behavioral
responses during the Emotional Go/No-Go task. Typically, participants in this task respond via
button press to targets presented on the majority of trials (e.g., happy faces), and are instructed to
withhold button presses for less frequent nontarget trials (e.g., fearful faces). This task affords
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simultaneous investigation of speed and accuracy of facial expression discrimination as well as
inhibition of prepotent responses (Tottenham et al., 2011). Further, the incorporation of affective
social stimuli allows for analysis of emotion-related biases on cognition and behavior. Because
the most effective emotion regulation is flexible and sensitive to individual goals and context
(Eisenberg et al., 2000; Gross & Thompson, 2007), task parameters were varied to examine
whether the hypothesized moderation of both neural (electrocortical) and behavioral responses
by mindfulness during the task were goal-sensitive (i.e., facilitated performance across divergent
task parameters). For example, responding quickly to emotional targets that evoke either avoid or
approach behavioral tendencies may be facilitated by more or less inhibition, respectively.
Assessment of ERPs alongside task performance has the added benefit of examining whether
mindfulness-based differences in ERP responses to affective stimuli are related to overt
behavior.
Primary Hypotheses
Past research suggests that dispositional mindfulness is associated with reduced ERP
amplitudes to unpleasant images (Brown et al., 2012) and reduced amygdala reactivity to angry
and fearful facial expressions (Way et al., 2010; Creswell et al., 2007). Therefore, participants
completed a passive viewing task of happy, neutral, and fearful faces to examine the influence of
dispositional mindfulness on early neural response to fearful faces. I hypothesized that LPP
amplitude would be larger for fearful versus neutral faces, and dispositional mindfulness would
be negatively correlated with LPP deflection to fearful facial expressions. Regarding the
Emotional Go/No-Go task, I hypothesized higher self-reported dispositional mindfulness would
predict faster discrimination (smaller RT) and less RT variability to all target stimulus types on
the Emotional Go/No-Go Task, and dispositional mindfulness would be a stronger predictor of
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RT to fearful faces, which is expected to be slower overall (Hare et al., 2005). I also predicted
that dispositional mindfulness would be associated with greater accuracy, indexed by fewer false
alarms (FAs) to all nontarget stimulus types. However, because it has been previously shown that
it is harder to inhibit happy faces than neutral or fearful faces (Hare et al., 2005), due to happy
faces evoking approach-oriented behavioral tendencies, I expected that dispositional mindfulness
would most strongly predict FAs for happy nontargets.
Consistent with the hypothesis that dispositional mindfulness will promote discrimination
between affective social stimuli, I also reasoned that mindfulness would be related to greater
N100 amplitudes to all stimulus types during the Emotional Go/No-Go (Vogel & Luck, 2000).
Additionally, I hypothesized that mindfulness would predict larger No-Go N2, reflecting greater
conflict monitoring of prepotent Go responses (Donkers & Van Boxtel, 2004), and that No-Go
N2 would be largest for happy nontargets, since approach oriented responses to happy faces are
harder to inhibit (Hare et al., 2005). Regarding the relation between ERP components and task
performance, it was hypothesized that more negative N100 would predict faster RT and fewer
FAs, consistent with its role in visual discrimination (Vogel & Luck, 2000). It was also
hypothesized that more negative No-Go N200 would predict fewer FAs. Further, these ERP
components were expected to mediate any significant associations between mindfulness and
respective behavioral outcomes.
State mindfulness was also tested as an independent predictor and as a moderator of
dispositional mindfulness, to assess whether mindfulness during the tasks significantly predicted,
or modified the predictive relation of trait mindfulness to the emotion and behavior regulation
outcomes. Rigorous investigation of mindfulness on early neural responses and behavior to
affective social stimuli should account for other variables which may heighten sensitivity and
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speed response time via different underlying mechanisms (e.g., attention bias to threat). As noted
earlier, greater early sensitivity to emotion-related stimuli may also characterize a variety of
mood and anxiety disorders (Beck, 1967; Vasey & MacLeod, 2001). In contrast to the
heightened sensitivity to others’ emotions hypothesized for dispositional mindfulness, the early
sensitivity to others’ emotions which characterizes mood and anxiety disorders has downstream
consequences that disrupt one’s own emotion regulation. Further, as a construct characterizing
open and receptive attention, adaptive for emotion regulation, mindfulness should predict neural
and behavioral responses distinct from constructs involving more concentrated attention (e.g.,
attentional control; Goodman, Quaglia, & Brown, in press). Therefore, it was hypothesized that
the all significant relations between dispositional mindfulness and outcome measures would hold
after accounting for two additional predictors that may predict similar results, but reflect
divergent underlying processes, namely distress contagion and attentional control.

Methods
Participants
A sample of 62 undergraduate students, 18 years or older, were recruited from Virginia
Commonwealth University and received course credit for their participation. Prospective
participants were recruited though online research participation software (Sona Systems; Tallin,
Estonia). Only Caucasian students were eligible to complete the online screening, in order to
minimize variation in response to facial stimuli due to race/ethnicity. All prospective participants
completed an initial online questionnaire to screen for right-handedness (because handedness has
been shown to affect ERP measurement), serious medical or neurological conditions,
prescription and recreational drug use, and recent psychiatric diagnoses. Subjects specified the
presence/absence of these conditions and behaviors with a summary yes or no response to a
16

longer list of conditions and behaviors, designed to reduce discomfort that may stem from
reporting specific sensitive information. There were 21 male participants (33%) and 41 females
(67%).
Two subjects were excluded from all analyses: one fell asleep during the experiment and
the other experienced a power outage during the study session. In addition, one participant was
excluded from LPP and N100 analyses because of irregularities during acquisition, and four
additional participants were excluded from N200 analyses because a hardware malfunction
prevented task performance data and ERPs from being merged. Thus, the final numbers of
participants included in each analysis were: 60 for behavioral, 59 for LPP and N100, and 55 for
N200.
Materials
Self-report. In addition to providing basic demographic information (age, sex),
participants completed a battery of self-report psychological measures. Relevant to this study
were the following scales:
Mindfulness. Dispositional mindfulness was measured using both the Mindful Attention
Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) and the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire
(FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006). The MAAS has demonstrated high reliability and validity (Brown &
Ryan, 2003), and has been used extensively in research on dispositional mindfulness.
Participants endorse items on the MAAS such as, “It seems I am ‘running on automatic,’ without
much awareness of what I’m doing,” on a Likert Scale (1= ‘Almost Always’ to 6 = ‘Almost
Never’). Therefore, the MAAS operationalizes the presence of mindfulness via 15 items
antithetical to mindful attention, such that higher scores reflect higher mindfulness. The
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the MAAS was .82 in this sample. The FFMQ is another well-
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validated measure of mindfulness, which assesses mindfulness on a 5-point scale from 1 (‘never
or very rarely true’) to 5 (‘very often or always true’). For the present analyses, only the FFMQ’s
Act with Awareness subscale was used, as other subscales may reflect skills associated with
mindfulness, rather than mindfulness itself (Brown & Cordon, 2009). Cronbach’s alpha for the
FFMQ was .71 in this sample.
As noted earlier, previous research suggests that accounting for mindful states during the
study may be important for understanding variation associating dispositional mindfulness with
emotion and behavior regulation at neural and behavioral levels of analysis. Therefore, the state
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (State MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) was used to capture
self-reported mindfulness specifically during the experiment.
Personal Distress. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) is a 28-item
self-report scale that measures cognitive and emotional components of empathy. The four
subscales of the IRI are intended to be analyzed separately, and of interest to the present study,
the Personal Distress (PD) subscale indexes distress experienced in interpersonal situations that
interferes with helping others (i.e., distress contagion). This subscale was chosen to represent a
form of heightened sensitivity to others that is antithetical to the type of heightened attention to
others’ emotions theorized to characterize mindfulness in social contexts, and correlates
positively with social anxiety (Davis, 1983). Sample Cronbach’s alpha for PD was .81.
Attentional Control. There is some dispute regarding whether mindfulness is distinct
from other sorts of attentional dispositions. In particular, establishing discriminant validity with
individual differences in voluntary control of attention is important to understand the open,
receptive quality of mindful attention. Therefore, the Attentional Control Scale (AC; Derryberry
& Reed, 2002) was employed in the present study, which measures dispositional attentional
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control on 4-point scale (‘almost never’ to ‘almost always’). Cronbach’s alpha for the ACS was
.81 in this sample.
Tasks and Stimulus Materials. The social stimuli were selected from the NimStim Face
Stimulus Set, previously used in an Emotional Go/No-Go task to assess approach/avoidance
tendencies to affective social stimuli (Hare et al., 2005). Images from twelve models total,
including three African American or Caucasian males and three African American or Caucasian
females, expressing happy, neutral, or fearful facial expressions were grayscaled and normalized
for luminance.
Passive Viewing. The participant was asked to engage in a passive viewing task, viewing
photographs of happy, neutral, and fearful faces on a 19’’ flat-screen LCD monitor at a distance
of approximately 34”, with a vertical visual angle of 20°. The task included 150 trials, divided
into 5 equal blocks, each separated by a 30-second break. The images were presented in a prearranged random order for 5 s each, with a random interstimulus interval of between 2 s and 4 s.
Emotional Go/No-Go. Following a procedure used in past research (Hare et al., 2005), a
fixation cross was presented to participants on the same 19’’ flat-screen LCD monitor, at the
same viewing angle, for 2000 ms, followed by a stimulus. Participants were instructed to press a
response key using a button box to fearful, happy, or neutral faces only, depending on the
condition. Condition A and Condition B were counterbalanced, such that half the participants
completed Condition A first (randomly assigned). Condition A first responded to fearful targets,
presented randomly on 70% of trials, while 30% of the stimuli were happy faces or neutral faces
(alternating blocks). After eight blocks of 60 trials, Condition A participants switched to
alternating blocks of happy targets/fearful non-targets and neutral targets/fearful non-targets.
Condition B received the same conditions, but in reverse order. Participants completed twenty
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practice trials before beginning the experimental stage of each condition, the latter of which
consisted of 480 trials divided into eight equal trial blocks, separated by short rest breaks.
Behavioral responses were recorded via a dominant hand button press on a button box placed on
a stable board on the lap. Performance was assessed by response time (RT), False Alarms (FA),
and RT variability.
Procedure
Participants reported individually to a quiet laboratory in the Department of Psychology
where the general outline and purpose of the study was described. Participants were then asked
to review and sign an informed consent form. A questionnaire assessing the inclusion criterion
(right-handed) and exclusion criteria for the study was completed and verified. Excluded
participants received partial credit and were thanked for their time. A packet of questionnaires
was then completed by those passing the screen. After packets were completed, each participant
was directed to sign up for a time on a separate day to complete the EEG/task performance
portion of the study.
Within two to three weeks of completing questionnaires, participants reported to the lab
where cap placement occurred and EEG impedences were checked. In counterbalanced order,
participants completed the passive viewing task and the Emotional Go/No-Go Task, with all
participants viewing the same social stimulus set. Participants completed the state MAAS after
the passive viewing task and following every four blocks of the Emotional Go/No-Go Task.
Upon completion of a final state MAAS questionnaire, the experimenter removed the EEG cap,
and participants were thanked for their efforts, debriefed, and dismissed. The complete EEG/task
performance procedure took about 2 hours, including the intermittent breaks.
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Electrophysiological recording, artifact rejection, and component specification. All
electrophysiologic signals were acquired using a Neuroscan (El Paso, TX) SCAN NuAmps
Express 40 channel system. The EEGs and the EOGs were acquired at a gain of 20K (3.75 V/mm
equivalent) for a frequency bandwidth of 0.3-100Hz (24dB/octave). The EMGs were acquired at a
gain of 20K for an initial bandwidth of 30-1000Hz. The digital band-pass filter settings were as
follows: EOGs at 0.3-4Hz, EEGs at 0.3-20Hz, and EMGs at 30-250Hz. The timing, presentation,
and synchronization of stimulus presentation and the continuous EEG recording were controlled
on a PC using Stim2 software (Neuroscan; El Paso, TX). During the tasks, continuous EEG
signal was time-locked to the visual presentation of, and participant’s behavioral response to, the
social stimuli.
A semi-automatic artifact detection procedure in EEGLAB software was used to clean
EEG signal data and prepare it for subsequent analyses (Viola et al., 2009). An epoched average
waveform (all time points) was computed for each participant between -500 and 1500 ms preand post- stimulus, respectively. For the Emotional Go/No-Go task, average waveforms were
computed separately for correct versus incorrect trials. Independent component analysis (ICA)
was used to identify and partition artifact and brain-related signals. CORRMAP, an open-source
EEGLAB plug-in, was then performed to enable visual inspection and statistical removal of
exemplary artifacts (e.g., blinks). Waveforms were baseline corrected by averaging between -500
and 0 ms.
N100. Visual inspection of grand average waveforms for each task revealed an N100
peaking around 130 ms at electrode Cz, consistent with previous research (e.g., Campanella et
al., 2002; Kubota & Ito, 2007; Rossignol, Philippot, Douilliez, Crommelinck, & Campanella,
2005). The N100 was indexed by averaging activation at Cz for each stimulus type in a 50 ms
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window (Vogel & Luck, 2000) between 100 and 150 ms. Further, because previous research has
demonstrated that the N100 can be sensitive to top-down differences in executive control (Ruz et
al., 2012), averages for Go and No-Go trials were computed separately.
No-Go N200. Visual inspection of the grand average waveform for no-go stimuli
followed by correct omission of behavioral response revealed an N200 component peaking
around 260 ms, and maximal at FCz. Following previous work (Zhang & Lu, 2012; Bruin &
Wijers, 2002), the N200 ERP component was indexed as the amplitude between 200 and 350 ms
post-stimulus for three different frontocentral sites (Fz, FCz, Cz). Though the N200 was
computed for both go and no-go trials for comparison, only trials involving correct rejection to
no-go stimuli constitutes the No-Go N2 (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Amodio et al., 2008).
LPP. Consistent with the sustained positive deflection of the LPP in previous studies
(Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010a), visual inspection revealed the start of LPP around 500
ms and extending beyond 1000 ms. Following previous work on mindfulness and the LPP
(Brown et al., 2012), the LPP was indexed by the average amplitude at four different electrode
sites in a 400 ms window following the presentation of happy, neutral, and fearful facial
expressions. More specifically, the LPP was averaged across both an early (500-700 ms) and late
(701-900 ms) window because previous research suggests the LPP should be assessed across
multiple time windows (Hajcak et al., 2010a). LPP amplitudes during each window, and for each
stimulus type, were averaged separately at four different electrode sites across midline central
and posterior regions of the scalp (FCz, Cz, CPz, and Pz; Cuthbert et al., 2000; Schupp et al.,
2004).
Behavioral data preparation. RT for incorrect trials introduces greater error in
calculating average response times, so only RT for correct trials were included. To be certain that
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differences in RT variability were not due solely to differences in RT, the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation/RT) was used to index RT variability (Hendricks & Robey 1936). RT, RT
variability, and FAs were computed for each stimulus type. Before averaging, RTs reflecting
anticipatory or delayed responding (< 200ms or >1500ms, respectively) were removed (Vago &
Nakamura, 2011). Descriptive analyses revealed that the number of FAs for each stimulus type
were highly skewed and kurtotic. Thus, natural log transformations were applied to each
variable, resulting in normal distributions.
Results
Self-Report
Correlations between self-report scales were mostly as expected, and are reported in
Table 1. Interestingly, dispositional mindfulness was only significantly related to state
mindfulness during the Emotional Go/No-Go, and only as assessed by the MAAS.

Table 1.
Correlations between self-report scales
Observed Variable

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. MAAS

1

-

-

-

-

-

2. FFMQ Act with Awareness

.743**

1

-

-

-

-

3. AC

.438**

.480**

1

-

-

-

4. PD

-.228

-.292*

-.377*

1

-

-

5. State MAAS Passive Viewing
6. State MAAS Go/No-Go

.175
.274*

.150
.227

.188
.070

-.087
-.011

1
.511**

1

Note. * = p < .05; ** p < .001; FFMQ = Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire; MAAS =
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; SMAAS = State Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; PD =
Personal Distress; AC = Attentional Control
23

Given that dispositional mindfulness has been considered as a tendency to engage in
mindful states (Brown & Ryan, 2003), a lack of clear demonstration of association between trait
and state mindfulness during the study indicates important variability in state mindfulness during
the experiment unaccounted for by dispositional mindfulness.
ERP during Emotional Go/No-Go Task
N100. To test the hypotheses that dispositional and state mindfulness would predict
larger average N100 amplitudes to social stimuli, repeated measures mixed (multilevel) model
analyses, using restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992)
were run. At the level of repeated-measures, Condition (fearful, happy, or neutral facial
expression) and Stimulus Type (Go vs. No-Go) were dummy coded (0, 1, 2; and 0, 1,
respectively). Analyses were first conducted to see whether there was a main effect of these level
one predictors. Initial analyses revealed no main effect of condition, type, or their interaction (ps
> .10). Subsequently, these predictors were retained in the model, but no cross-level interactions
between condition, type, and individual level predictors were tested.
Next, two multilevel models were run, each covarying one self-report dispositional
mindfulness measure (MAAS, FFMQ Act with Awareness), together with state MAAS during
the Emotional Go/No-Go Task. Additionally, because the order of the tasks (passive viewing and
Emotional Go/No-Go) was counterbalanced, task order (hereafter, Order) was included at the
individual level to control for variability due to task counterbalancing. Exemplary of models
used throughout this paper, Table 2 presents equations for the repeated measures mixed models
which covary MAAS:
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Table 2.
Primary Repeated Measures Mixed Model Equations for Each Outcome Variable
Equations

Variables
Yij = Outcome variable

N100:
Yij= (00+ 01Z1j + 02Z2j + 03(Z1j x Z2j) + u0j) + (10+
u1j)X1ij+ (20+ u2j)X2ij + rij

Repeated Measures Predictors:
X1ij = Stimulus Condition (happy, fearful, neutral)
X2ij = Stimulus Type (Go vs. No-Go)
X3ij = Signal Window (Early vs. Late)

N200:
Yij= (00+ 01Z1j + 02Z2j + 03(Z1j x Z2j) + u0j) + (10+
u1j)X1ij+ (20+ 21Z1j + 22Z2j + 23(Z1j x Z2j) + u2j)X2ij
+ rij
LPP:
Yij= (00+ 01Z1j + 02Z2j + u0j) + (10+ u1j)X1ij + (30+
u3j)X3ij + rij
RT, RT Variability:
Yij= (00+ 01Z1j + 02Z2j + u0j) + (10+ u1j)X1ij + rij
FA:
Yij= (00+ 01Z1j + 02Z2j + u0j) + (10+ 11Z1j + 12Z2j
+ u1j)X1ij + rij

Person Level Predictors:
Z1j = MAAS score
Z2j = State MAAS score
Coefficients:
00 = Avg. intercept for individuals with mean scores
on predictors
01, 11,21 = Avg. slope relating MAAS to outcome
variable
10, 20, 30 = Avg. slope relating Stimulus Condition,
Type, or Signal Window (respectively) to outcome
variable
02,12, 22 = Avg. slope relating state MAAS to
outcome
03,13, 23 = Avg. slope relating MAAS x state
MAAS to outcome variable
Residual Variances:
u0j = Variance of participant’s intercept around the
mean intercept
u1j, u2j, u3j = Variance of participant’s slope around
mean slope
rij = Variance of participant’s outcome around mean

Note. To simplify presentation, Task Order (a control variable) is omitted from equations.
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Regarding dispositional mindfulness, both MAAS [F(1, 49) = 6.21, p = .016] and
FFMQ Act with Awareness [F(1, 49) = 5.78, p = .020] significantly predicted more negative
N100 amplitude. For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 presents topographic maps and grand
average waveforms highlighting these associations between mindfulness and the N100.
Interestingly, the N100 with low FFMQ Act with Awareness appears lateralized to the left. In
neither model was state MAAS a significant predictor of N100 amplitude (ps > .07), however,
the interaction between FFMQ Act with Awareness and state MAAS was marginally significant
[F(1, 49) = 3.89, p = .054]. Consistent with the hypothesized unique influence of mindfulness,
these significant associations remained significant even after controlling either attentional control
or personal distress (ps < .03). Table 3 summarizes results for each primary analysis at the
electrode where the N100 component was maximal (Cz).
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Figure 1. Top: Scalp topographies based on tertiary split of FFMQ Act with Awareness (high,
medium, low from left to right) for 100-150 ms following stimulus onset during the Emotional
Go/No-Go Task. Darker blue indicates more negative activation. Bottom: Grand average
waveform at Cz for same tertiary split between -100 and 200 ms following all conditions and
stimulus types.
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Table 3.
Summary of N100 Results at Cz
Model
Base Model

Controlling for PD

Controlling for AC

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

FFMQ Act

-13.93* (5.79)

-13.36* (5.83)

-14.33* (5.78)

SMAAS

-10.62 (5.87)

-9.54 (5.94)

-10.76 (5.85)

3.52 (1.79)

3.19 (1.81)

3.55 (1.78)

FFMQ Act with
Awareness Model

FFMQ
Act*SMAAS
PD

-.35 (.31)

AC

-.48 (.34)

MAAS Model
MAAS

-12.33* (4.95)

-12.27* (4.93)

-12.04* (5.01)

SMAAS

-6.17 (5.56)

-5.49 (5.54)

-6.00 (5.60)

MAAS*SMAAS

2.06 (1.48)

1.87 (1.48)

1.99 (1.49)

PD

-.41 (.28)

AC

-.18 (.32)

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; FFMQ = Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire;
MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; SMAAS = State Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale; PD = Personal Distress; AC = Attentional Control

28

No-Go N200. To test the hypothesis that higher mindfulness would predict greater
No-Go N2 amplitude, repeated measures mixed models examined two repeated measures factors:
condition (fearful, happy, neutral) and Type (go vs. no-go). The following details analysis at
FCz, where the N200 was maximal, and summarizes findings at Fz and Cz. An initial model
tested the main effect of condition and Type on the N200 amplitude. Type was a significant
predictor of the N200 [F(1, 52) = 11.29, p < .001], but Condition was not (p > .10). TukeyKramer post-hoc tests revealed that the amplitude of the N200 was more negative for No-Go
than Go stimuli [t(1, 52) = 3.36, p < .001]. This is consistent with previous research suggesting
that the N200 reflects conflict monitoring of the prepotent response for No-Go stimuli. Similar
results were found at sites Fz and Cz (ps < .02).
Next, two multilevel models were run to test the effects of each dispositional
mindfulness scale (MAAS, FFMQ Act with Awareness), together with state MAAS during the
Emotional Go/No-Go task, on N200 amplitude. It was hypothesized that mindfulness would
predict more negative No-Go N200 across conditions. As with the N100, task order (passive
viewing vs. Emotional Go/No-Go first) was included at the individual level to control for
variability due to task counterbalancing.
Regarding dispositional mindfulness, FFMQ Act with Awareness [F(1, 45) = 5.14, p =
.028] and the MAAS [F(1, 45) = 13.87, p < .001] significantly predicted more negative N200
amplitude at FCz. For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 presents a median split of MAAS and its
relation to N200 for No-Go stimuli, and Table 4 summarizes the results at FCz. Further, state
MAAS was negatively associated with N200 amplitude in both models [MAAS model: F(1, 45)
= 9.24, p = .004], and the interaction between state and dispositional mindfulness was significant
for the MAAS [F(1, 45) = 9.77, p = .003], and marginally significant for FFMQ Act with
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Awareness [F(1, 45) = 3.92, p = .054]. Interestingly, plotting these interactions revealed that the
relation between dispositional mindfulness and more negative N200 was stronger for those lower
in state mindfulness. There were no significant interactions with Type in either model at FCz.

Figure 2. Top: Topographic maps based on a median split of the MAAS (high MAAS on left) for
200-350 ms following stimulus onset for all No-Go trials during the Emotional Go/No-Go Task.
Darker blue indicates more negative activation. Bottom: Grand average waveform for high (blue)
vs. low (green) MAAS between -100 and 400 ms, based on median split for No-Go trials during
the Emotional Go/No-Go.
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Table 4.
Summary of N200 Results at FCz
Model
Base Model

Controlling for PD

Controlling for AC

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

-10.87* (5.76)

-11.16* (5.84)

-10.88* (5.79)

SMAAS

-7.74 (5.47)

-10.02 (5.86)

-9.72 (5.78)

FFMQ
Act*SMAAS

2.92 (1.76)

3.03 (1.79)

2.92 (1.77)

FFMQ Act with
Awareness Model
FFMQ Act

PD

.09 (.31)

AC

-.11 (.34)

MAAS Model
MAAS

-17.99** (5.23)

-18.21*** (5.31)

-18.39*** (5.30)

SMAAS

-16.19** (5.82)

-16.49** (5.93)

-16.47** (5.89)

MAAS*SMAAS

4.47** (1.58)

4.56** (1.62)

PD

4.57** (1.60)

.09 (.29)

AC

.18 (.33)

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; FFMQ = Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire;
MAAS = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; SMAAS = State Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale; PD = Personal Distress; AC = Attentional Control
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A very similar pattern of significant associations were found at electrodes Fz and Cz,
except that there were also significant interactions between state mindfulness and Type [MAAS
model: F(1, 250) = 4.35, p = .038], MAAS and Type [F(1, 250) = 5.22, p = .023], as well as a
marginally significant interaction between FFMQ Act and Type [F(1, 250) = 3.55, p = .060] at
electrode Cz. Further, there were significant three-way interactions between state mindfulness,
Type, and each dispositional mindfulness scale: MAAS [F(1, 250) = 5.32, p = .022], and FFMQ
Act with Awareness [F(1, 250) = 3.94, p = .048] at Cz. For each two-way interaction,
dispositional mindfulness was a stronger predictor of more negative N200 amplitude for No-Go
versus Go stimuli. Each three-way interaction revealed that the relation between dispositional
mindfulness and more negative No-Go N200 (relative to Go N200) depended on state
mindfulness, such that this relation was stronger for those higher in state mindfulness. In
summary, mindfulness was related to larger (more negative) N200 generally, and was an even
stronger predictor of No-Go N200 at Cz. A simple slopes analysis revealed that the relation
between mindfulness and N200 for Go stimuli was also significant at Cz. For models controlling
either personal distress or attentional control, a similar pattern of significant associations
between mindfulness and N200 amplitude was found across sites of interest.
ERP during Passive Viewing
LPP. To test the hypotheses that dispositional and state mindfulness would predict
smaller average LPP amplitudes to fearful faces, repeated measures mixed (multilevel) model
analyses were conducted with signal window (early versus late) and the three stimulus conditions
(happy, neutral, fearful) as condition-level repeated measures factors. Dispositional (MAAS or
FFMQ Act with Awareness) and state mindfulness (State MAAS) was included as individual-
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level predictors. The following LPP analyses detail findings at site CPz (c.f., Brown et al., 2012),
where the LPP was maximal, and summarize findings from other sites (FCz, Cz, Pz).
Preliminary analysis revealed no main effect of signal window, stimulus condition, or
task order on LPP amplitude at any electrode site (ps > .05). Next, each dispositional
mindfulness scale was included in a separate model, together with state mindfulness. Regarding
dispositional mindfulness, neither the MAAS [F(1, 55) = 0.02, p = .889], nor the FFMQ Act with
Awareness subscale [F(1, 55) = .38, p = .541], were significant predictors of LPP amplitude.
Additionally, there were no significant interactions between dispositional mindfulness, window,
or condition (ps > .10). Regarding state mindfulness, state MAAS was a significant predictor of
LPP [FFMQ Act Model: F(1, 55) = 7.64, p = .008], but importantly, this relationship was in the
direction opposite to what was expected. Higher state mindfulness was associated with larger
LPP amplitudes generally. However, there were no significant interactions between state
mindfulness, window, or condition (ps > .30). The primary results at site CPz are presented in
Appendix A. Analyses at FCz, Cz, and Pz were consistent with those found at CPz.
Behavioral Responses
Response Time and Response Time Variability. To test the hypotheses that
mindfulness would predict faster RT and less RT variability, repeated measures mixed models
were run with condition (fearful, happy, and neutral) as the repeated measures factor and each
self-report mindfulness scale as individual level predictors (MAAS or FFMQ Act with
Awareness), including state MAAS. Additionally, Order was included in the model to control for
task order effects. Regarding RT, an initial model found no main effect of condition [F(2, 57) =
.32, p = .728]. This indicates that there was no emotional modulation of RT. However, there was
an effect of Order such that those who completed the Emotional Go/No-Go after the passive
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viewing task had significant faster RT [F(1, 57) = 5.12, p = .028]. Next, two models were tested
to assess whether mindfulness predicted significantly faster RT. Consistent with the hypothesis,
both MAAS [F(1, 56) = 7.61, p = .007] and FFMQ Act with Awareness predicted significantly
faster RT [F(1, 56) = 4.37, p = .041]. State mindfulness, on the other hand, did not significantly
predict RT [F(1, 56) = .23, p = .634]. After controlling for attentional control, which was not a
significant predictor of RT (p > .10), the relation between each dispositional mindfulness scale
and RT remained significant (p < .05). Further, after controlling for personal distress, which
itself predicted faster RT [MAAS model: F(1, 55) = 5.40, p = .024], both the MAAS [F(1, 55) =
10.16, p = .002] and the FFMQ Act with Awareness subscale [F(1, 55) = 7.00, p = .011]
remained significant predictors of faster RT. These results, summarized in Table 5, indicate a
distinct relation between mindfulness and faster RT.

34

Table 5.
Summary of Response Time Results
Model
Base Model

Controlling for PD

Controlling for AC

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

FFMQ Act

-.44* (.21)

-.57** (.21)

-.55* (.24)

SMAAS

-.01 (.09)

.01 (.08)

.33 (.53)

FFMQ Act with
Awareness Model

PD

-.26* (.11)

AC

-.13 (.13)

MAAS Model
MAAS

-.52** (.18)

-.60 (.18)**

-.62** (.20)

SMAAS

.02 (.09)

-.03 (.08)

-.02 (.08)

PD

-.24* (.11)

AC

-.15 (.12)

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01; FFMQ = Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire; MAAS = Mindful
Attention Awareness Scale; SMAAS = State Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; PD = Personal
Distress; AC = Attentional Control

Regarding RT variability, indexed by the coefficient of variation (standard
deviation/RT), none of the self-reported mindfulness scales predicted less RT variability (ps >
.10). These results for RT variability are presented in Appendix A. Together these results do not
support a relation between mindfulness and RT variability.
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Accuracy. The hypothesis that mindfulness would predict greater accuracy (fewer
FAs), was also tested with a repeated measures mixed model. An initial model found that
condition was a significant predictor of the number of FAs [F(2, 57) = 35.32, p < .001]. TukeyKramer post-hoc tests revealed that, compared to fearful No-Go stimuli, the number of FAs were
higher for both neutral [t(1, 57) = 5.84, p < .001] and happy faces [t(1, 57) = 8.00, p < .001].
There was no significant difference between neutral and happy faces (p > .10). This is consistent
with previous research suggesting that it is easier to inhibit a Go response to fearful No-Go
stimuli, presumably because it is consistent with approach/withdraw tendencies (Hare et al.,
2005). Regarding mindfulness, none of the mindfulness scales predicted fewer FAs for any nogo stimulus type (ps > .10). Appendix A presents results for FA analyses.
Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff? As described above, both dispositional mindfulness
scales were related to faster RT but neither was significantly associated with fewer FAs. In
contrast to hypotheses, a nonsignificant, positive correlation to FAs was found for the FFMQ Act
with Awareness subscale. To account for a possible speed-accuracy tradeoff, an additional model
was run to test the association between dispositional mindfulness and RT, controlling for the
number of FAs. Both the MAAS and the FFMQ Act with Awareness subscale remained
significant predictors (ps < .05), indicating that the relation between mindfulness and faster RT is
not explained by a speed-accuracy tradeoff.
ERP – Behavior Relations
To test the hypotheses that ERP components would predict behavioral outcomes,
repeated measures mixed models were run with condition (fearful, happy, and neutral) and ERP
components of interest as repeated measures factors. Additionally, Order was included as an
individual level predictor to control for task order effects. Two models were run to assess
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whether N100 amplitude at Cz predicted RT and FA. While N100 at Cz did not significantly
predict RT [F(1, 55) = .02, p = .897], higher N100 did predict significantly fewer FAs [F(1, 55) =
4.67, p = .035]. However, because self-reported mindfulness did not significantly predict FAs,
mediation was not tested. Regarding the hypothesis that more negative No-Go N200 would
predict fewer FAs, models were run to test this relation at each germane electrode site (Fz, FCz,
and Cz). In contrast to expectations, No-Go N200 was not a significant predictor of FAs [at FCz:
F(1, 51) = .04, p = .837]. Similar results were found at electrodes Fz and Cz.
Discussion
Mindfulness has been previously linked to differential processing of emotional
information (e.g., De Raedt, Baert, Demeyer, & Goeleven, 2012; Farb et al., 2010; Ortner,
Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007), and more recently with attenuated early neural reactivity to affective
imagery (Brown et al., 2012). The present study investigated the role of mindfulness on three
components of “upstream” processing of social affective information. Specifically, this research
examined self-reported dispositional and state mindfulness as predictors of neural and behavioral
responses across passive viewing and Emotional Go/No-Go tasks involving happy, neutral, and
fearful facial expressions. Consistent with hypotheses for the Emotional Go/No-Go Task,
associations were found between higher mindfulness and more negative N100, N200, and No-Go
N200 amplitudes, as well as faster discrimination of facial expressions. However, in contrast to
expectation, there were no significant associations between mindfulness and RT variability or
accuracy (number of FAs). Further, ERP components did not mediate the predicated associations
between self-reported mindfulness and behavior. Finally, the hypothesized relation between selfreported mindfulness and LPP amplitudes to fearful facial expressions during the passive
viewing task was not found. Though not all hypotheses were supported, these findings extend
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research on the neural correlates of mindfulness and promote our understanding of how
individual differences in mindfulness contribute to social emotion regulation.
Summary of Results
The present study is the first to my knowledge that demonstrates a relation between
dispositional mindfulness and the N100. Assessment of ERPs during the Emotional Go/No-Go
task revealed that mindfulness predicted more negative N100, an ERP component previously
linked to early top-down deployment of attentional resources (Ruz et al., 2012). Though some
research has found an emotional modulation of the N100 component (Luo et al., 2010),
emotional facial expression did not modulate the N100 in the present study. Additionally, there
were no differences in N100 amplitude for Go versus No-Go stimuli across the sample.
Dispositional mindfulness moderated N100 amplitude for all conditions and stimulus types,
suggesting greater allocation of attention to the task generally. Further, this relation between
dispositional mindfulness and the N100 remained significant after controlling for either
attentional control or personal distress, suggesting mindfulness distinctively impacts early
attentional allocation. The fact that mindfulness remained significant after controlling for the
tendency to reactively “catch” others’ distress in social situations (personal distress), together
with empirical support that dispositional mindfulness promotes enhanced emotion regulation
(e.g., Hill & Updegraff, 2012), indicates it is unlikely that this enhanced early attention is
maladaptive to emotion regulation. It is important to address why dispositional mindfulness may
have been a stronger predictor of N100 amplitude for those lower in state mindfulness during the
task. One explanation for this finding is simply that there was less variability in attention to be
explained by dispositional mindfulness for participants high in state mindfulness during the task.
Together, these findings suggest that heightened mindful attention influences processing very
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early (< 200 ms post-stimulus onset), and provide empirical support for theoretical accounts of
mindfulness as a process involving heightened attention to moment-by-moment experience
(Brown & Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Perhaps the N100 serves as one neurophysiological
mechanism for such present-oriented, heightened attention.
Individual differences in mindfulness were also evident slightly further “downstream”,
in the N200, between 200 and 350 ms post-stimulus. Though I hypothesized a relation between
mindfulness and No-Go N200 in particular, mindfulness was a significant predictor of both the
No-Go N200 (at Cz) and the N200 (Fz, FCz, and Cz) more generally. The N200 may be an index
of early deployment of attention generally and, in the context of social stimuli, more negative
N200 may reflect more individuated processing of faces (e.g., Kubota & Ito, 2007). Thus, these
findings provide further support that dispositional mindfulness is related to greater selective
attention, and may also promote more individuated processing of facial expressions. Regarding
the No-Go N200, the association between dispositional mindfulness and more negative
amplitudes indicates that mindfulness involves greater conflict monitoring of the prepotent Go
response (Donkers & Van Boxtel, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). As with the N100, this is the
first study to demonstrate an association between dispositional mindfulness and the amplitude of
this early ERP component. Moreover, these relations held after controlling for attentional control
and personal distress. That mindfulness is related to greater conflict monitoring provides support
for theories that mindfulness promotes ongoing monitoring of internal and external stimuli
(Brown et al., 2007), including one’s own cognitive processing.
Following Brown et al.’s (2012) findings of an attenuated LPP for high arousal
unpleasant stimuli, I expected to find an association between self-reported dispositional and state
mindfulness and unpleasant social stimuli (fearful facial expressions). However, there was no
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main effect of stimulus condition in the present study, indicating that the LPP was not sensitive
to the valence of social stimuli. This stands in contrast to a previous study that found greater LPP
for fearful facial expressions selected from the same stimulus set used in the present research
(Smith, Weinberg, Moran, & Hajcak, 2012), as well as other studies which have found the LPP
to be sensitive to valence of facial expressions (for a review, see Hajcak et al., 2010). Further,
and in contrast to expectations, the only significant association was a relation between state
mindfulness and greater LPP amplitudes to all stimulus types. On one hand, heightened LPP
amplitudes with state mindfulness might suggest greater evaluation to facial expressions.
However, since state mindfulness was assessed immediately following the passive viewing task,
a task involving limited demands on attention, LPP may instead reflect gross differences in
spatial attention to the facial expressions (e.g., Keil, Moratti, Sabatinelli, Bradley, & Lang,
2005). In other words, individuals lower in state mindfulness may not be selectively attending to
the facial expressions adequately to evoke a larger LPP. Perhaps insufficient spatial attention to
stimuli in the passive viewing task also explains why there was no emotional modulation of LPP
in the present study.
The task behavioral results demonstrated that dispositional mindfulness predicted
faster discrimination of facial expressions. Mindfulness remained significant after controlling for
personal distress, suggesting that mindfulness promotes faster RT in a manner distinct from
factors involving maladaptive heightened sensitivity to others facial expressions (e.g., social
anxiety). Moreover, faster RT associated with mindfulness was not explained by tradeoffs in
accuracy. Together these results suggest that mindfulness facilitates discrimination of others’
emotional facial expressions in a manner likely to support adaptive social behavior that is timely,
but not at the expense of accuracy or one’s own level of distress. In contrast to expected findings,
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mindfulness was not linked to greater inhibition of prepotent responses on the Emotional Go/NoGo task. This lack of association is inconsistent with some previous research (e.g., Josefsson &
Broberg, 2011) demonstrating a relation between dispositional mindfulness and executive
control, but consistent with a different study that did not find such a relation (Galla et al., 2011).
Nonetheless, mindfulness was linked to higher conflict monitoring of prepotent Go responses, as
indexed by higher No-Go N200 (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). Though a relation between No-Go
N200 and FAs was expected, failure to find this association is consistent with another study that
examined individual differences in No-Go N200 amplitude (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee,
2007). This indicates that individual differences in No-Go N200 may not be related to actual
inhibition of prepotent behavioral responses, but instead reflect detection of conflict between
behavioral tendency and task demand more generally (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003).
Towards an Understanding of Mindful Emotion Regulation in Social Contexts
Recent models of emotion regulation emphasize the importance of allocation of
attention shortly following stimulus onset. More specifically, early attention biases to emotional
stimuli have been construed as part of emotion regulation, underscoring the relevance of
differential early attentional processing to emotion regulation broadly (Todd et al., 2012).
Further, the process-specific timing hypothesis of emotion regulation (Sheppes & Gross, 2011)
highlights the interplay between emotion and attention occurring early (< 1 sec.) following an
emotional event. This theory suggests that more “upstream” deployment of top-down attention
may be less effortful and thus more adaptive than regulatory strategies occurring later. Thus far,
the process-specific timing hypothesis has focused on early strategies of distraction or attentional
avoidance (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). However, data from this study contributes to a growing
body of literature (e.g., Brown et al., 2012; Vago & Nakamura, 2011) that suggests a third early
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regulation strategy, markedly different from distraction and avoidance. Specifically, the present
study suggests an emotion regulation “strategy” involving greater, rather than less, allocation of
attentional resources to affective stimuli. Critically, this early heightened attention appears
distinct from the vigilance of personal distress, a variable characterized by distress contagion in
social contexts. Nonetheless, future research should develop more precise understanding of ways
that mindfulness promotes early attention to social stimuli in a manner distinct from the
heightened early attention that characterizes anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
Though N100 amplitudes did not predict RT on Go trials, previous research suggests
that N100 may reflect a discrimination process within the focal point of attention (Vogel & Luck,
2000). More negative N100 amplitude did predict fewer FAs, consistent with its role in
discrimination between different types of facial expressions. While dispositional mindfulness did
not predict fewer FAs, it did predict faster discrimination (RT) without comparable decreases in
accuracy (i.e., no speed-accuracy tradeoff). Perhaps faster discrimination among more mindful
individuals was due in part to less interference by nontargets on RT. How might such faster
discrimination of others’ emotional facial expressions support social emotion regulation?
Discrimination awareness makes information flexibly available to serve as input for a broad
range of processes (Grossenbacher & Quaglia, in preparation). More specifically, discrimination
of others’ emotional facial expressions may contribute to improved emotion regulation in social
contexts, through making another’s emotions available to inform behavior that is both timely and
appropriate (Tottenham et al., 2011). Indeed, differing patterns in speed and/or accuracy for
discriminating emotional facial expressions have been related to distinct patterns of behavior in
social situations (Tottenham et al., 2011). For example, on an Emotional Go/No-Go task,
adolescence has been linked to more rapid discrimination of target stimuli but less ability to
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withhold task-inappropriate responses to affective facial expressions (Tottenham et al., 2011).
The rapidity of discrimination (RT) for emotional facial expressions is therefore an important
index for understanding the speed at which information becomes available to inform and guide
conscious social behavior in the presence of others’ emotions. The pattern of results in the
present study suggest that more mindful individuals are faster to discriminate others’ emotions
while maintaining a normative level of withholding task-inappropriate responses.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present study had several limitations that are important to address. First,
emotional modulation of ERP components (LPP) and behavior (RT) found in similar previous
research (e.g., Hajcak et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2012) were not found in the
present study. This constrained analysis of mindfulness as a moderator of automatic response
tendencies (e.g., approach vs. withdrawal orientation). An influence of emotion consistent with
previous research was evident in number of FAs, such that there were less errors of commission
for fearful nontargets (Hare et al., 2005). The exact reason for the lack of typical emotional
responses to emotional facial expressions is unknown, since stimuli from the same stimulus set
(NimStim; Tottenham et al., 2009) produced reliable responses in previous research (Hare et al.,
2005; Smith et al., 2012). Second, findings from this study are correlational, and although I
controlled for attentional control and personal distress, results could be due to a variable
correlated with mindfulness that was not assessed. Future research should experimentally
manipulate mindfulness (e.g., mindfulness training) to better discern whether mindfulness causes
these differences in neural and behavioral responses. A third limitation of the present study is
that all participants were Caucasian. Though this homogeneity of participants facilitates
investigation of some questions related to mindfulness (e.g., mindfulness as a moderator of
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neural and behavioral responses to racial outgroups), it does limit generalizability of the present
findings. Investigating neural and behavioral responses across a more diverse sample should be a
goal of future research on mindfulness and social emotion regulation.
Conclusion
Previous research has demonstrated that dispositional mindfulness is related to
differential neural response to high arousal pleasant and unpleasant imagery less than 1 s after
stimulus onset. The present research found that dispositional mindfulness predicted neural
activity even earlier, evident in distinct ERP components (N100, N200, No-Go N200) less than
300 ms after stimulus onset. Further, dispositional mindfulness predicted faster discrimination of
emotional facial expressions without decrements in accuracy. These findings highlight the
importance of individual differences in mindfulness to understanding basic processes of social
emotion regulation, including the potential adaptive role of early attentional allocation to others’
emotions. This knowledge may inform basic and applied questions in social, cognitive, and
clinical psychology and neuroscience pertaining to mindfulness, emotion regulation in social
contexts, and the contributions of social emotion regulation to mental health.
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Appendix A

Table 6.
Summary of LPP at CPz, Response Time Variability, and False Alarm Results
Outcome
LPP

RT Variability

FAs

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

.80 (.57)

-.16 (.18)

.20 (.49)

1.64* (.80)

-.10 (.08)

-.07 (.53)

MAAS

.41 (.43)

-.14 (.33)

-.13 (.37)

SMAAS

.86 (.74)

-.26 (.47)

-.45 (.53)

FFMQ Act with
Awareness Model
FFMQ Act
SMAAS
MAAS Model

Note. * p < .05; FFMQ = Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire; MAAS = Mindful Attention
Awareness Scale; SMAAS = State Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
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